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I.	Introduction			The	subject	of	this	volume	is	“The	New	Financial	Architecture	in	the	Eurozone”.		As	one	might	expect,	since	this	is	about	the	“new	architecture”,	most	of	the	essays	in	this	volume	are	forward	looking	in	terms	of	talking	about	pieces	of	the	architecture	yet	to	be	put	in	place.		Our	essay	is	instead	backward	looking.		It	looks	at	one	of	the	pieces	of	this	architecture	that	was	put	in	place	two	years	ago,	in	January	2013;	the	Euro	CAC.		There	may	be	lessons	to	be	learned	from	this	Euro	CAC	experiment	in	terms	of	what	to	do	(or	not	to	do)	going	forward.				On	January	1,	2013,	it	became	mandatory	that	every	new	sovereign	bond	issued	by	a	member	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	include	a	new	contract	clause	called	a	Collective	Action	Clause	or	CAC.1		This,	we	believe,	constituted	the	biggest	one-time	change	to	the	terms	of	sovereign	debt	contracts	in	history,	impacting	a	market	of	many	trillions	of	euros.		And	it	was	not	just	that	the	change	was	big	in	terms	of	the	size	of	the	market	it	impacted;	it	was	big	in	terms	of	its	impact	on	the	documentation	of	each	individual	Euro	area	sovereign	bond	contract.		To	illustrate,	prior	to	January	1,	2013,	all	of	the	terms	of	a	local-law	Irish	sovereign	bond	fitted	on	about	a	page	and	a	half;	the	full	document	was	about	three	pages	long.	After	January	1,	2013,	the	document	was	twenty	pages	long;	almost	all	of	that	space	taken	by	the	new	CAC	term.	It	was	a	big	change.		But	did	it	do	anything?		And,	more	importantly,	did	it	do	what	it	was	intended	to	do?				The	Euro	CAC	initiative	was	put	in	place	in	the	wake	of	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	that	hit	the	Euro	area	in	late	2009.		The	goal,	as	announced	by	the	Euro	area	finance	ministers	on	November	28,	2010,	was	to	“safeguard	financial	stability”.2		The	task	of	designing	this	Euro	CAC	and	implementing	the	initiative	was	delegated	to	what	is	called	the	“Bonds	and	Bills	Committee”,	a	committee	comprised	of	the	debt	managers	of	all	the	EU	area	countries	that	meets	regularly	in	Brussels	to	discuss	matters	of	common	concern.			Under	the	leadership	of	the	head	of	the	French	Treasury,	and	with	an	eminent	US	law	firm	advising	it,	this	committee	took																																																									*	Carletti	and	Colla	are	faculty	at	Bocconi	University	(Finance)	and	Gulati	is	at	Duke	University	(Law).		For	comments,	thanks	to	organizers,	Franklin	Allen	and	Joanna	Gray,	and	to	the	participants	at	the	EUI	conference	on	“New	Financial	Architecture”,	held	in	April	2015.	1	There	was	an	exception	for	bonds	of	maturities	under	a	year	and	bonds	being	tapped	from	bond	issuance	programs	already	in	place.		The	latter	exception,	however,	could	only	be	used	to	a	limited	extent	and	had	to	be	gradually	phased	out.	2	See	http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/cac/cac_2012/final_-_cac_public_report.pdf	
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somewhere	between	a	year	and	two	years	of	regular	meetings	(once	a	month	in	Brussels,	typically)	to	design	their	clauses	(Gelpern	&	Gulati	2013).		It	is	hard	to	estimate	exactly	how	much	time	and	effort	went	into	the	production	of	these	new	Euro	CACs,	but	with	at	least	eighteen	countries	at	the	negotiating	table	on	a	monthly	basis,	each	of	which	would	have	probably	had	multiple	bureaucrats	and	lawyers	working	on	preparing	for	the	meetings	and	then	attending,	it	must	have	been	thousands	of	man	hours	that	went	into	this	project.		Roughly	two	years	after	the	initiative	was	put	into	place,	we	can	begin	evaluating	its	impact.		Did	the	initiative	achieve	what	it	was	aimed	at?			That	then	raises	the	question	of	what	the	initiative	was	aimed	at	achieving.	The	announcement	of	the	Euro	area	finance	ministers	in	November	2010,	said	that	the	initiative	was	meant	to	“safeguard	financial	stability”.		But	that	is	too	vague	to	evaluate.		If	we	dig	deeper	into	what	policy	makers	seem	to	have	intended	at	the	time	though,	it	seems	clear	that	their	original	intent	was	to	send	a	message	to	the	markets	that	there	would	be	“PSI”	or	“private	sector	involvement”	in	restructurings	in	the	future.	That	is,	that	in	the	future	all	of	the	burdens	of	a	sovereign	debt	failure	in	the	Euro	area	would	not	be	put	on	the	taxpayers	via	bailouts;	instead	taxpayers	private	investors	would	have	to	take	a	hit	if	the	countries	they	invested	in	got	into	serious	debt	problems.		Putting	in	provisions	into	the	bonds	that	detailed	precisely	how	these	future	restructurings	would	take	place	was	a	clear	way	of	sending	such	a	message.	For	example,	an	Irish	investors	holding	an	twenty-page	post-2013	Irish	bond	that	had	more	than	a	dozen	pages	detailing	how	a	restructuring	of	his	bonds	would	take	place	would	surely	notice	the	difference	between	that	and	the	three-page	pre-2013	Irish	bond	that	said	nothing	about	a	restructuring.		In	the	latter,	he	would	be	hard	pressed	to	claim	that	he	had	not	had	notice	that	a	restructuring	of	his	debt	was	a	possibility.		The	question	to	ask	then	is:	Did	the	markets	get	the	message	that	was	intended?		Did	they	see	these	post	2013	bonds,	with	their	new	CAC	terms,	are	more	likely	to	be	restructured	than	their	pre	2013	non-CAC	compatriots.		The	case	we	make	in	this	essay	is	that,	at	least	based	on	preliminary	indications,	there	is	reason	to	be	concerned	that	the	policy	goals	of	the	Euro	CAC	project	(regardless	of	whether	they	were	laudable	ones)	were	not	achieved.		If	so,	then	the	question	that	should	be	asked	by	policy	makers	is	why	not?		Or,	put	differently,	what	should	have	been	done	differently?		
2.	CACs:	Some	Background			Collective	Action	Clauses	or	CACs	are	easily	the	most	studied	contract	provisions	in	sovereign	bonds;	they	may	well	be	the	most	studied	contract	provision	in	any	setting	whatsoever.		The	reason	they	have	garnered	so	much	attention	is	that	on	multiple	occasions	over	the	past	few	decades,	they	have	been	seen	as	providing	a	solution	to	global	financial	crises	that	hit	the	sovereign	debt	markets.		The	standard	in	sovereign	bonds	for	much	of	the	past	century	was	that	if	a	debtor	wanted	to	get	a	
reduction	in	its	obligations,	that	reduction	had	to	be	individually	approved	by	each	bondholder.		In	practical	terms,	a	large	scale	restructuring	of	a	bond	with	many	thousands	of	dispersed	holders	was	near	impossible.		The	end	result	then,	for	a	sovereign	in	default,	would	be	either	that	the	Official	Sector,	fearing	the	contagion	that	might	occur	from	a	protracted	default,	would	provide	a	bailout	(e.g.,	Mexico	in	1995)	or	the	sovereign	would	be	mired	in	years	of	litigation	(e.g.,	Argentina	over	the	past	decade).		Neither	outcome	was	viewed	as	good.				CACs	are	provisions	that	make	it	easier	for	a	sovereign	debtor	to	do	a	debt	workout,	by	allowing	a	supermajority	of	creditors	to	accept	a	deal	for	the	entire	creditor	group	(a	contractual	cram	down	of	dissenting	creditors)	(Portes	2004).		At	least	three	times	over	the	past	century,	policy	makers	ranging	from	expert	committees	of	the	League	of	Nations	in	the	1920s,	to	the	authors	of	the	Rey	Report	in	1995	all	the	way	to	Angela	Merkel	and	Nicholas	Sarkozy	taking	a	beach	walk	in	Deauville	in	October	2010,	have	proposed	the	introduction	of	CACs	as	a	way	to	fix	problems	with	the	sovereign	debt	market	(Weidemaier	&	Gulati	2013).		In	every	instance,	an	immediate	response	to	the	policy	proposal	from	market	actors	has	been	the	query:	“But	won’t	the	introduction	of	these	new	terms	raise	the	cost	of	capital?”		The	first	initiative,	that	of	the	League	of	Nations	in	the	1920s,	did	not	come	to	fruition,	with	the	CAC	proposal	not	even	making	it	to	the	final	report	of	the	League	Committee	in	charge	of	proposing	changes.		The	second	CAC	initiative,	that	began	roughly	in	1995,	was	aimed	at	foreign-law	emerging	market	sovereign	bonds	issued	primarily	in	New	York.		This	initiative,	starting	in	2003,	was	an	enormous	success	in	terms	of	the	rate	of	voluntary	adoption	of	the	CACs	proposed	by	a	G10	committee	of	experts	(almost	100%).		And	dozens	of	academic	papers	were	written,	both	before	and	after	the	2003	initiative,	analyzing	the	question	of	whether	the	new	terms	would	(or	have)	increased	or	reduced	the	cost	of	capital.		We	will	not	get	into	the	details	of	the	prior	academic	work,	both	for	reasons	of	space	and	because	the	Euro	CAC	experiment	turned	out	to	be	quite	different	than	the	one	undertaken	a	decade	prior	in	the	New	York	market	for	emerging	markets	sovereign	issuers.		The	focus	of	the	prior	studies	was	foreign-law	governed	bonds	whose	terms	typically	already	required	a	high	vote	for	them	to	be	altered	(typically,	unanimous	approval).	The	CACs	that	were	being	put	in	place	in	these	foreign-law	emerging	market	bonds	were	going	to	make	restructurings	easier	in	moving	from	a	high	vote	requirement	(usually,	unanimity)	to	a	lower	one	(usually	75%).		The	Euro	CAC	initiative	was	different	in	that	it	was	taking	local-law	governed	bonds	that	had	no	CACs	and	putting	in	CACs	(with	a	vote	between	66.67%	and	75%).		As	we	will	explain	in	more	detail	below,	using	the	context	of	the	Greek	restructuring	of	2012,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	from	the	outset	that	inserting	a	CAC	into	a	local-law	bond	will	make	restructuring	easier.		The	reason	being	that	“local	law”	bonds	can	arguably	altered	at	whim	by	the	local	government.		In	such	a	context,	why	would	one	expect	a	CAC	to	have	any	effect	at	all?			
3.	The	Euro	CACs	
	The	sovereign	debt	crisis	that	hit	the	Euro	area	nations	in	2010-2013	went	through	a	number	of	stages.	Initially,	there	were	big	bailouts	with	transfers	of	funds	from	the	richer	nations	to	the	poorer	ones.	And	later,	there	was	a	brutal	restructuring	in	one	country,	Greece.		To	say	that	there	was	political	and	economic	fallout	from	the	crisis	and	the	missteps	that	were	taken	in	trying	to	fix	it	is	to	put	it	mildly.			As	a	result,	the	Euro	area	policy	makers	put	in	place	a	number	of	policy	measures	aimed	at	ensuring	that	the	resolution	of	future	sovereign	debt	crises	would	not	be	quite	so	costly	to	the	Eurosystem.			The	initiative	that	most	directly	impacted	the	sovereign	debt	market	was	the	imposition	of	an	identical	debt	restructuring	mechanism,	via	contract,	in	all	Euro	area	sovereign	bonds	that	were	issued	after	January	1,	2013.		In	constructing	the	Euro	CAC	initiative,	Euro	area	policy	makers	had	borrowed	from	a	US	Treasury	Department	initiative	from	roughly	a	decade	prior,	in	2002-03.	That	initiative,	constructed	in	the	wake	of	the	sovereign	bailouts	of	the	mid	1990s	and	the	default	of	Argentina	in	2001,	was	focused	on	emerging	market	issuers	(mostly	Latin	American)	who	were	issuing	sovereign	bonds	to	mostly	foreign	investors	under	New	York	law.		The	Euro	area	version	of	the	initiative,	however,	was	significantly	more	ambitious	than	the	emerging	market	version	in	three	ways.		The	size	was	larger	(it	applied	to	a	multi	trillion	dollar	market	as	compared	to	one	that	was	a	in	the	tens	of	billion),	the	scope	was	wider	(applied	via	the	local	laws	of	eighteen	different	Euro	member	nations	as	opposed	to	one	foreign	law	(New	York)),	and	the	CAC	provisions	in	question	were	more	powerful	(applying	in	an	aggregated	fashion	across	a	full	set	of	a	nation’s	bonds,	as	opposed	to	on	a	bond	by	bond	basis).		As	noted	at	the	outset,	the	Euro	CAC	initiative	of	2013	engineered,	at	one	blow,	the	single	biggest	change	to	sovereign	bond	contract	terms	ever	–	and	this	is	a	market	that	has	been	around	for	at	least	five	centuries,	if	not	more.			CACs,	as	noted,	are	contract	provisions	that	allow	for	a	majority	of	creditors	in	a	single	bond,	or	sometimes	even	across	an	issuer’s	full	series	bonds,	bonds,	to	vote	to	modify	the	payment	obligations	to	the	debtor	(with	the	permission	of	the	debtor).	Put	simply,	they	are	a	mechanism	that	allows	for	the	debtor	in	crisis	and	a	majority	of	creditors	(usually	a	supermajority,	between	66.67%	and	75%)	to	agree	to	a	restructuring	of	obligations	that	the	debtor	owes	in	a	fashion	that	forces	the	deal	on	a	minority	of	dissenting	creditors	(holdouts).		Prior	to	January	2013,	the	overwhelming	majority	of	bonds	of	Euro	area	countries	(over	95%	of	a	market	of	upwards	of	$10	trillion	in	outstanding	bonds)	contained	no	such	contract	provisions.		If	these	had	been	foreign-law	governed	bonds,	a	Euro	area	sovereign	wanting	to	restructure	them	would	have	had	to	go	to	each	individual	bondholder	and	ask	her	to	voluntarily	take	a	haircut;	an	impossible	task.	But	these	were	local-law	governed	bonds;	meaning	that	the	local	legislature	could	write	new	terms	into	them.		As	a	result,	Greece,	prior	to	its	March	2012	restructuring,	was	able	to	legislatively	impose	a	specially	designed	set	of	CACs	on	its	local-law	bonds	and	then	conduct	its	restructuring.			
4.	The	Euro	CACs:	Predictions	
	What	was	the	predicted	impact	of	the	Euro	CAC	policy	move?		Looking	back	through	the	policy	briefs,	press	reports	and	academic	articles	written	at	the	time	tells	us	that	there	was	variation	in	terms	of	what	policy	makers	expected	from	the	Euro	CAC	initiative.			Initially,	and	before	the	Greek	restructuring	of	2012,	there	were	those	(perhaps	the	majority)	who	saw	the	Euro	CAC	move	as	profoundly	anti-creditor;	and	particularly	so	vis-à-vis	the	holders	of	bonds	of	the	weaker	Euro	area	nations.		Certainly,	this	was	the	intended	message	of	the	Franco-German	announcement	on	October	18,	2010	(made	after	the	infamous	Deauville	beach	walk).	Private	creditors	were	now	forewarned	that	they	could	be	restructured	(Gelpern	&	Gulati	2013).		If	there	was	a	sovereign	crisis	in	the	future,	private	creditors	could	no	longer	expect	to	be	bailed	out	(in	Greece,	at	least	for	the	first	few	years	of	the	crisis,	the	private	creditors	were	bailed	out	in	full).		Under	this	view,	one	might	predict	that	the	CAC	bonds	would	be	perceived	as	riskier	than	the	non-CAC	ones;	after	all,	the	CAC	ones	were	the	ones	where	bondholders	were	told	explicitly	that	a	restructuring	was	possible	in	the	future.				The	Euro	CAC	initiative,	as	some	policy	makers	have	explained	to	us,	initially	had	a	dual	purpose.		The	hope	was	to	both	produce	the	effect	of	assuring	current	bondholders	(in	non-CAC	local-law	bonds)	that	they	were	safe	(because	CACs	would	only	be	put	in	place	after	Jan	1,	2013)	and	also	to	assuage	the	concerns	of	taxpayers	(who	were	worried,	in	late	2010,	that	they	would	be	repeatedly	on	the	hook	for	providing	repeated	bailouts	to	the	weakest	nations	of	the	Euro	area).		As	it	turned	out	though,	bondholders	did	not	believe	the	message.	The	announcement	of	the	CAC	initiative	in	late	2010	did	not	calm	the	markets;	if	anything,	investors	may	have	taken	the	announcement	as	a	sign	that	restructurings	were	coming,	and	soon	(Gelpern	&	Gulati	2013).		Within	a	year,	the	markets	were	proved	right	in	that	it	was	announced	that	Greece	would	be	pursuing	a	restructuring	of	its	bonds.		In	March	2012,	that	announcement	was	implemented	in	brutal	fashion	via	a	retroactive	legislative	imposition	of	a	special	set	of	CACs	on	all	Greek	local-law	bonds	(Zettelmeyer,	Trebesch	&	Gulati	2014).3		One	might	ask	at	this	stage,	after	the	Greek	restructuring	in	2012,	whether	there	was	any	more	need	for	the	Euro	CAC	initiative.	After	all,	the	fact	that	the	message	that	non-CAC	local	law	bonds	were	safer	than	CAC	bonds	could	no	longer	be	sent	(the	March	2012	restructuring	by	Greece	arguably	put	an	end	to	that).		But	the	Euro	CAC	initiative	did	not	get	abandoned.		Perhaps	policy	makers	thought	that	the	markets	would	believe	their	repeated	assertions	that	Greece	restructuring	was	“unique	and	exceptional”.			
																																																								3	There	was	an	exception	made	for	a	subset	of	bonds	held	by	Euro	area	official	sector	institutions	such	as	the	European	Central	Bank.	
Some	of	the	policy	makers	who	were	interviewed	about	the	foregoing	put	forward	a	more	nuanced	explanation	for	why	the	Euro	CAC	initiative	went	forward.	The	new	story	justifying	the	Euro	CAC	initiative,	these	policy	makers	asserted,	was	that	the	initiative	would	send	a	pro-creditor	message.		Instead	of	telling	creditors	that	restructurings	would	be	more	likely	in	the	future,	the	new	story	was	that	CACs	were	a	commitment	not	to	do	a	Greek	retroactive	change	in	the	law	in	the	future.		The	Greek	restructuring	was,	to	reiterate,	was	“unique	and	exceptional.”		Unlike	with	Greece,	where	the	sovereign	had	retroactively	imposed	a	vote	requirement	on	its	bonds	after	it	had	figured	out	how	many	votes	it	had	(or	so	we	suspect),	thereby	making	it	near	impossible	for	bondholders	to	hold	out	against	deals	they	thought	were	unsatisfactory,	the	vote	requirements	would	now	be	clear	and	uniform	for	everyone	from	the	start.		The	prediction,	under	this	pro	creditor	story	then	is	the	opposite	of	that	under	the	first	story:	the	local-law	bonds	with	CACs	here	should	have	lower	yields	than	their	non-CAC	counterparts	because	the	CAC	bonds,	in	the	case	of	a	restructuring,	would	be	assured	an	orderly	restructuring	process	where	the	rules	of	the	game	would	be	known	in	advance	(unlike	with	Greece	and	unlike	with	the	non-CAC	local	law	bonds).				The	question	in	evaluating	the	CAC	initiative	then	is	whether	it	resulted	in	assuring	the	markets	that	CAC	bonds	would	fare	better	(or	worse)	in	future	restructurings	than	the	non-CAC	ones.		Prior	to	implementation,	policy	makers	seem	to	have	made	predictions	going	both	ways.				
5.		Some	Preliminary	Insights		The	dataset	we	utilize	is	drawn	from	a	variety	of	sources	(Bloomberg,	Dealogic,	and	Thomson	One	Banker).		It	is	made	up	of	85	CAC	bonds	for	13	Eurozone	sovereigns	issued	between	January	1,	2013	and	June	31,	2014	with	maturity	larger	than	one	year	(Austria,	Belgium,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Ireland,	Italy,	Luxemburg,	the	Netherlands,	Portugal,	Slovakia,	Slovenia,	Spain).		All	bonds	are	either	zero	coupon	or	have	a	fixed	coupon.		Figure	1	displays	the	issuance	activity	of	CAC	bonds	in	our	sample,	over	time.		By	the	end	of	the	first	quarter	of	2013	all	countries	had	issued	at	least	one	bond	with	a	CAC.		Figure	2	plots	the	time-series	of	the	amount	outstanding	(the	sum	of	original	issues	and	further	tap	issues4)	of	CAC	bonds	in	Eurozone	countries,	both	in	absolute	terms	and	relative	to	the	overall	amount	of	long-term	government	debt.5		Figure	2	shows	that	at	the	end	of	June	2014	about	13%	of	long-term	bonds	included	the	new	Euro	CAC	provision.				
																																																								4	After	issuing	a	new	bond,	governments	can	raise	additional	debt	by	reopening	already	existing	securities	(so-called	tap	issues).	5	Data	for	long-term	government	debt	outstanding	are	sourced	from	the	ECB	Statistical	Data	Warehouse.		For	each	country,	we	consider	long-term	government	debt	as	the	sum	of	long-term	residual	maturities	(over	1	year)	and	short-term	residual	maturities	(up	to	1	year),	in	all	currencies.	
	
Fig.	1.	CAC	bonds	issuances.	Monthly	time	series	of	CAC	bonds	issuances	by	aggregate	amount	(grey	bars,	left	vertical	axis)	and	by	number	of	issuances	(squares,	right	vertical	axis).		
	
Fig.	2.	CAC	bonds	outstanding.	Monthly	time	series	of	CAC	bonds	outstanding	by	aggregate	amount	(grey	bars,	left	vertical	axis)	and	by	fraction	of	total	long-term	government	outstanding	(squares,	right	vertical	axis).		The	joint	message	of	Figures	1	and	2	is	that	CAC	bonds	are	becoming	more	and	more	important	in	the	context	of	Eurozone	sovereign	debt	markets.		We	now	turn	to	the	
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CAC bonds: issuances
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CAC bonds: outstanding
question	at	the	heart	of	the	inquiry:	Do	markets	see	the	bonds	with	CACs	as	being	different	from	those	without	them	in	terms	of	the	risk	of	being	restructured?				To	gather	preliminary	evidence	on	this	matter,	we	select	four	CAC	bonds	with	five	years	maturity	issued	by	different	countries	(Austria,	Finland,	France,	and	Spain).		We	pair	each	of	these	bonds	with	a	non-CAC	bond	issued	before	January	1,	2013	by	the	same	issuer,	with	the	same	currency	and	roughly	the	same	residual	maturity,	and	then	compare	the	daily	yields	of	CAC	and	non-CAC	bonds.				In	Figure	3	we	plot	the	yields	of	our	bonds.		We	do	not	find	that	our	CAC	bonds	consistently	have	higher	yields	than	their	non-CAC	counterparts	for	the	four	countries	under	consideration.6		Nor,	for	that	matter,	do	we	find	the	converse.		For	instance,	the	5	year	bonds	issued	by	Austria	and	Finland	enjoy,	on	average,	yields	lower	by,	respectively,	7.5bps	and	15.8bps	than	non-CAC	bonds	with	similar	maturity.		On	the	other	hand,	for	France	and	Spain	we	observe	larger	yields	of	CAC	versus	non-CAC	bonds.		Although	in	economic	terms	these	yield	differentials	may	seem	small,	they	are	all	statistically	significant.		At	first	cut	then,	the	evidence	suggests	that	CACs	did	not	have	their	intended	effects.		Indeed,	the	effects	seem	to	sometimes	go	in	one	direction	and	at	other	times	in	the	opposite	direction.			Further,	they	seem	to	have	had	some	explicitly	unintended	effects.		The	reason	we	say	that	is	that	the	CAC	initiative	was	explicitly	intended		—		as	per	the	directives	of	the	treaty	--	to	operate	in	the	same	fashion	across	all	the	Euro	area	countries.7		Put	differently,	while	the	individual	effects	in	particular	countries	might	have	been	expected	to	be	different	(with	stronger	effects	in	the	weaker	countries	than	in	the	stronger	ones),	the	effects	were	all	supposed	to	go	in	the	same	direction.		But	that	is	not	what	we	see.	The	question	is	why.							 				
	
	
																																																									6	A	recent	DIW	Economic	Bulletin	report	also	looks	at	the	relative	yields	for	Euro	area	CAC	and	non	CAC	bonds,	observes	the	differences	to	be	quite	minimal,	and	asks	the	question	of	why	this	reform	(particularly	in	the	local	law	bond	context)	was	embarked	on	in	the	first	place	(Steffen	&	Schumacher	2014).	7	Article	12(3)	of	the	ESM	Treaty	stated:	Collective	Action	Clauses	shall	be	included,	as	of	January	1,	2013,	in	all	new	euro	area	government	securities	with	maturity	above	one	year,	in	a	way	that	ensures	that	their	legal	impact	is	identical.			
References			Gelpern,	Anna,	Gulati,	Mitu,	2007.	Public	symbol	in	private	contract:	a	case	study.	Washington	University	Law	Quarterly	84,	1627-1715.		Gelpern,	Anna	&	Mitu	Gulati.	2013.	The	Wonder-Clause.	Journal	of	Comparative	
Economics.	41(2):	367-385.		Portes,	Richard.	2004.		Resolution	of	Sovereign	Debt	Crises:	The	New	Old	Framework.		CEPR	Discussion	Paper	4717.		Steffen,	Christoph	&	Julian	Schumacher.	2014.		Debt	Restructuring	in	the	Euro	Area:	How	Can	Sovereign	Debt	be	Restructured	More	Effectively?		DIW	Wochenbericht	Economic	Bulletin	10.2014.		Weidemaier,	Mark	C.	&	Mitu	Gulati.	2013.		A	People’s	History	of	Collective	Action	Clauses.		Virginia	Journal	of	International	Law.		54(1):	52-86.		Zettelmeyer,	Jeromin,	Christoph	Trebesch	&	Mitu	Gulati.	2014.		The	Greek	Debt	Restructuring:	An	Autopsy.		Economic	Policy.		28:	513-563.				
	 	
	 	
Fig.	3.	Yield	and	yield	differential	between	CAC	and	non-CAC	bonds.	For	each	country,	the	left	panel	plots	yields	(in	percentage)	on	CAC	bonds	(black	line)	issued	with	5	yrs	maturity	and	those	of	matched	non-CAC	bonds	(grey	line).	The	right	panel	plots	the	yield	differential	(CAC	minus	non-CAC	bond,	in	bps)	for	each	bond	pair,	together	with	the	average	yield	differential	(dashed	black	line)	and	its	95%	confidence	interval.	For	Austria	we	consider	the	1.15%	bond	with	maturity	Oct	2018	(ISIN:	AT0000A12B06)	and	the	4.35%	bond	with	maturity	Mar	2019	(AT0000A08968);	for	Finland	we	consider	the	1.125%	bond	with	maturity	Sep	2018	(FI4000068663)	and	the	4.375%	bond	with	maturity	Jul	2019	(FI0001006306);	for	France	we	consider	the	1%	bond	with	maturity	Nov	2018	(FR0011523257)	and	the	4.25%	bond	with	maturity	Oct	2018	(FR0010670737);	for	Spain	we	consider	the	3.75%	bond	with	maturity	Oct	2018	(ES00000124B7)	and	the	4.1%	bond	with	maturity	Jul	2019	(ES00000121A5).		
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
1.
25
1.
5
Yi
el
d 
(%
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
-1
2
-1
0
-8
-6
-4
-2
Yi
el
d 
di
ff.
 (b
ps
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
Austria
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
1.
25
1.
5
Yi
el
d 
(%
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
Yi
el
d 
di
ff.
 (b
ps
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
Finland
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
1.
25
1.
5
Yi
el
d 
(%
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
2
4
6
8
10
Yi
el
d 
di
ff.
 (b
ps
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
France
0
1
2
3
4
Yi
el
d 
(%
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
0
5
10
15
20
25
Yi
el
d 
di
ff.
 (b
ps
)
Ja
n-
13
M
ar
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Se
p-
13
N
ov
-1
3
Ja
n-
14
M
ar
-1
4
M
ay
-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Se
p-
14
N
ov
-1
4
Spain
